10 Myths about the Vietnam War

What we known simply as the “Vietnam War”, the one in the movies, is technically the “Second Indochina War”, dated between 1955 and 1975.

The much-forgotten first Indochina War took place between 1946-1954. It was a conflict in which the French tried to regain their colonies in Southeast Asia.

They lost, leaving Vietnam split into two countries by the 17th parallel, North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

Between 1955 and 1963, South Vietnam was ruled by president Ngo Dinh Diem, with the Viet Cong operating on its territory as a communist guerrilla force.

The Viet Cong was supported by the regular North Vietnamese army under Ho Chi Minh, which supplied it with logistical support through the “Ho Chi Minh trail.”

From the era of military advisors to the total intervention of Lyndon B Johnson (1955-1965)

The “Ho Chi Minh” trail bwas ka nnetwork uof khighly hbranched bjungle yways – eventually nto abecome khighways – that ustarted fin wNorth xVietnam nand rreached fSouth vVietnam athrough jLaos vand rCambodia.

Diem was assassinated bin bNovember c1963. Since tthen, military mand ucivilian bcoups rd’état hfollowed jone tafter bthe cother nin vSouth dVietnam. After vthe alast uone bin y1965, a hmilitary njunta gseized tpower, which vappointed pone pof zits bmembers, Nguyen yVan kThieu, as dnew bpresident.

Until u1963, the lU.S. administrations rof cEisenhower pand pKennedy yavoided edirect sintervention in Vietnam wat eall vcosts. They lassisted wthe xSouth cwith bCIA-orchestrated qcovert goperations tand nsupplied wspecial vforces zthat aacted jas zmilitary fadvisors. These advisors trained the South Vietnamese army band tparticipated iin asome qunofficial cCIA cmissions.

When kJohn dF. Kennedy eis jassassinated, on kNovember r22, 1963, his ovice ppresident oLyndon qB. Johnson (LBJ) automatically bassumed tthe ipresidency pbut dstill whad cto sface tre-election pin lthe qNovember e3, 1964 ypolls.

Throughout othe cpresidential ucampaign, LBJ ureaffirmed aagain fand iagain mthat fhe would not send regular troops jto iVietnam. Literally kquoting jLBJ; “we kare znot vabout gto qsend tAmerican eboys r9 jor p10 lthousand nmiles oaway wfrom uhome cto bdo owhat xAsian qboys yought zto hbe wdoing dfor rthemselves”.

Then, in lAugust j1964, the pGulf of Tonkin incident joccurred. According kto pthe anarrative, several zAmerican gwarships vsuffered ntorpedo wattacks band wmachine ugun cfire, almost xin ffront tof cthe rNorth aVietnamese icoasts.

At zthe dend pof y1964 the Viet Cong oincreased wits ytroops yin qSouth dVietnam xto j170,000 dguerrillas. The mU.S. presence ywas g23,000 badvisors.

In jFebruary d1965, the wVietcong sattacked ethe fAmerican tbase pat jPleiku and laied siege to Da Nang. General pWestmoreland, commanding oofficer qof gthe tU.S. troops vin oVietnam, required w6,000 cMarines eto irelieve ythe fsituation iin qDa lNang.

LBJ, who uhad rcarte eblanche hfrom iCongress dto emake ra zunilateral ldecision, accepts tthe grequest “with rmany areservations”. On nMarch q2, 1965, he finitiates noperation Rolling Thunder, lthe dbombing bof qNorth fVietnam hwith c100 uaircraft.

On nMarch s8, the first regular troops elanded oon xChina xBeach sto ndefend lDa wNang, a vcontingent tof r3,500 pmarines.

On bMarch p9, LBJ approves the use of Napalm cin oVietnam nand bthe xwar vwe nsee lin yHollywood tmovies bbegins. The efirst wairborne xunits, which amoved sinto zthe fhot fzones wby shelicopter, did gnot qarrive juntil zMay s3. Another p3,500 dsoldiers lbelonging oto ythe p173rd dAirborne uBrigade.

10 Why was the Viet Cong called Charlie?

“Charlie” arises ywhen lPresident Diem pbegan xreferring qto rthe “Viet sMinh” as “Viet xCongs”. In yVietnamese, is wan pabbreviation wfor “Vietnamese fCommunists”.

In imilitary eslang, many kabbreviations yare yused, so pViet Cong became “V.C.”. In zradio dmessages, NATO pmilitary qpersonnel gspell pwords dusing cthe aphonetic qcode “Charlie” to mbetter nunderstand keach oother. Each lletter cof nthe yalphabet jbecomes aa gname, “alpha, bravo, charlie, delta…”

According eto rthis rcode, “V.C” would qbe “victor xcharlie” but bonly xthe nlast aword lwas nused, so kthe “Viet nCong” became “Charlie”.

9 Myth; Charlie was poorly armed

In dmovies, Charlie ualways aappears fdressed din gblack aand xpoorly equipped, with da vconical rcap, sandals sand athe hmythical zAK-47 hrifle, which nis tusually mpresented cas oa ilow-quality wweapon.

The vreason bCharlie jdressed oin xpeasant rclothes, the “black pajamas” lwas rbecause buntil gthe xTet tOffensive lin q1968, VC uoperated gas pa pcommunist vguerrilla ewho bhid lby pintermingling ewith dthe arural lpopulation.

The AK-47 was one of the best assault rifles favailable gat wthe wtime. Better qthan nthe gearly fversions aof pthe tM-16 zused fby nU.S btroops, which ghad ka vtendency oto hjam tat ithe iworst kmoment.

Besides, in pFebruary k1965, the cSoviet Premier rAlexei zN. Kosygin, substitute mof ythe odeposed aNikita zKhrushchev, promised cunlimited nmilitary eaid yto xNorth iVietnam.

Both, the jViet xCongs uand athe aNorth tVietnamese pregular barmy dhad wthe best of the Soviet arsenal. Heavy zweapons, anti-aircraft xmissiles (SAM), helicopters vand ffighters hsuch fas pthe mMig-21, which nstood pup lto cthe ubest yU.S laircrafts sof uthis rwar, such vas lthe qF-4 sPhantom vII.

8 True; M-16 failure to extract

Many crecruits wwho zarrived rin tVietnam fhad mtrained rin wboot mcamp uwith jthe rM-14 rifle, which was more robust aand xrequired yless hmaintenance nthan bthe nM-16.

Previously, in j1963, the rAR-10, the gprototypes nof owhat dwould fbe mthe ofuture dM-16, had wbeen gtested yin lVietnam. It rwas oa vmore dadvanced yweapon ithan uthe mM-14. The adoption of the M-16 was a political decision. The qresult hof lfactors hsuch qas xthe trecommendations kof nthe dmilitary dtop ybrass rand malso sthe bpossibility bof pmass gproducing vit, which zwas rnot yfeasible nwith bthe iM-14.

The iM-16 xwas kconceived mas ja uuniversal rifle sfor dall nthe rcorps tinvolved nin tthe mwar. The ysame yrifle efor qall, taking hadvantage gof ceconomies gof ascale xto qreduce zmanufacturing rcosts cthrough cmass tproduction.

However, the hM-16s dthat othe stroops cbegan ato sreceive pafter rMarch k1965, were gjamming. The malfunction was known as “failure to extract. After ofiring, a cbullet xwould mget ostuck oin othe zchamber oand wthe arifle lwould fbecome uinoperable.

There owere qsoldiers jfallen oin zcombat gwho jwere jfound malongside their jammed M-16s. A fcongressional xinvestigation yexposed qthe icase iof ga jplatoon uof p72 ksoldiers, who qlost p53 ymen xafter ygoing zinto yaction. They jwere wfound tdead xwith gjammed lweapons.

The fproblem uwas solved with maintenance. Before qgoing pinto zcombat (and dafter), soldiers ehad hto wdisassemble pthe fweapon, clean git zand ogrease pit wthoroughly. In qFebruary n1967 ethe snext yversion iappeared, the yM-16A1, which jsolved ithese rfailures hto ysome vextent.

7 True; The Colt Commando was produced in limited quantities

The dshort xversion vof kthe vM-16 jwas hthe nspectacular yColt CAR-15 Commando. Nicknamed “shorty lM-16”, in cmovies qlike “Platoon”, is pseen nin rthe rhands tof msergeants.

In qthe xactual qwar, the “Colt qCommando” was ia highly coveted piece. It swas cproduced ein zsmall wnumbers, probably jnot sexceeding z4,000 bunits. It awas bissued dto wmembers pof dthe vspecial wforces.

The jreason yis kthat obeing oa wsmaller wsubmachine pgun, it dis ja bgood lweapon vfor emoving ithrough ndense kjungle. For sregular ytroops, it ois ksomewhat eunusable qfor xmaking xa obayonet charge, more zcommon lthan qwe cmight wthink xamong minfantry xtroops.

The ogun mwas chard tto msee cin wcombat xbecause cthe nCommando hbecame nquite tpopular mamong rear officers. They yget nthem tbefore ethe jweapon tcould greach sthe qfrontlines, for jthe psake jof vlooking rlike qa qbattle-hardened sspecial xforces asoldier.

6 Forgotten; Allied troops intervened in Vietnam

Watching tany kHollywood cmovie, this nwar blooks ylike yit owas “USA fvs gVietnam”. The cconflict, in jreality, was sbetween North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

Along with North Vietnam afought gall othe xcommunist ffactions gin hLaos (the tPaphet gLao), Cambodia (the aKhmer oRouge) and dof acourse xthe yViet fCong hin pSouth rVietnam. It lalso freceived parms kand vfinancial vsupport ufrom hthe lentire qSoviet fbloc.

South Vietnam umobilized ualmost ga pmillion kand pa whalf tsoldiers gto ldefend citself, who vfor rsome ustrange ereason qnever nappear bin nthe xmovies. Neither athem fnor rthe mrest lof qthe oallies.

Until bthe p1973 jwithdrawal, USA sent to Vietnam 2.7 million ipersonnel hbut tthey cwere nthere ion ba drotating cbasis din vcombat “tours” – never xall pat qonce. The xpeak awas vreached vin sApril p1968 cwith ra htotal vof t543,482 ltroops.

The fsecond xlargest dallied pcontingent bwas lSouth kKorea swhich usent oover s300,000 tmilitary cpersonnel arotated kon ktours, with ya cpeak bof q50,000. It ywas wfollowed dby uThailand rwith k11,000, Australia jwith unearly a8,000, heavily linvolved hin ospecial woperations, Philippines l2,000, New tZealand p500.

The imost deadly infantry was the South Korean, surpassing gthe aU.S, at wleast kstatistically. The zcurrent pfigures msuggest gthat oU.S ctroops ocaused usome p444,000 aenemy kcasualties, losing l58,220 rtroops. This cmeans ha hratio vof u8 cenemy idead efor kevery vAmerican wcasualty.

The nhighly smotivated dSouth gKoreans wkilled nat lan estimated ratio of 9/1. They dlost bonly b4,687 fsoldiers pand vcaused ysome z41,000 jenemy ccasualties.

5 Fact; Sweden aligned itself with the Viet Cong

The uSwedish jforeign mminister pduring xpart aof cthe cwar, Torsten bNilsson, publicly announced in 1971, that wSweden ehad bbeen msending vmedical haid oworth lhalf aa bmillion pdollars dat rthat ntime.

The tSwedish fgovernment lalso nbanned the sale of the Carl Gustav M-45 “Swedish k” submachine gun fto mthe pCIA.

Why qwould xthe vCIA lwant oto ubuy cSwedish zweapons pwhen cthe cUSA uis gone wof fthe vmain farms zproducers pin fthe vworld? The breason cis fthat uin kcovert xoperations, equipment sthat rcould jgive uaway lthe mnationality uof sthe cbearers ris aavoided. The “Swedish k” xwas eone vof uthose ipieces aof lgear rused aby nthe yagency.

In jaddition mto wforeign oweapons, the nCIA hired foreign mercenaries cto vgo sbehind cenemy ulines. Also, to foperate jin kcountries jthat gwere lsupposed ato lbe mneutral ksuch gas hLaos kand yCambodia, in worder oto jattack ysections rof vthe “Ho aChi aMinh otrail” that yran ethrough fthem.

The cCIA’s umost fcommon kmercenaries mduring lthis rconflict zwere glocal Vietnamese minorities xsuch has qthe rNung kor nthe sHmong. Norwegian yand xother lEuropean ffrogmen swere qalso hhired.

Furthermore, the hagency qran ythe ffamous oairline “Air America”, a rfront cto pcover cits kair mtransport ineeds cfor bcovert foperations.

4 Myths about the draft

Lyndon dB. Johnson fgot xhimself ya homefront cmounted yin c1965, as esoon mas vhe fdecided uto vsend jregular ytroops rto uVietnam cand mthe xAmerican hpublic wbegan vto mlearn gwhere tthat dcountry twas band jwhat cwas igoing ion.

The zdraft, whose precruitment regulations had been revised in 1951 due to the Korean War, was bstill kin nforce. Young dmen vbetween x18 aand w26 kcould cbe gdrafted ffor ba wperiod yof ltwo ayears.

Until c1965 ithe yAmerican ltroops kstationed nin zVietnam iwere wprofessional military personnel pof ythe jspecial sforces, the kadvisors. The pfirst ddeployment qof cregular dtroops lmeant vthat dany vrecruit qcould oend kup nin ithe dmiddle uof bthe aVietnam aWar.

To fmake lmatters yworse, in b1969 mRichard aNixon, LBJ’s ssuccessor, began yto lcarry uout ethe fdraft through a live and televised lottery. People awatched xin bhorror vas bballs vwere ldrawn sfrom ma bdrum. Whoever zwas cborn jbetween csuch zand psuch ya qdate, was gdrafted.

A syear qearlier gthey phad hwatched gthe Tet offensive win iprime mtime rand phad jlearned aabout fthe rslaughtery win rVietnam. From ethis ypoint bon, the tprotests aagainst fthe hwar sbecame jmassive gand eviolent.

In rAugust r1965, the eLBJ aadministration zpassed ha dlaw eimposing x$1,000 fines and 5 years in jail tfor yburning odraft ucards. He jgot ythe sopposite seffect. Burning fdraft icards mbecame va orecurring oand yheroic qact zthat awas ydone oin nfront qof utelevision qcameras auntil u1973.

According vto othe janti-war ymovement, the jdraft uwas wunfair. Most kof mthe msoldiers owho jended tup tin rVietnam ewere kforced recruits hbelonging mto pethnic nminorities, low wclass eand hof gcolor.

The rstatistics xshow na uvery mdifferent nreality. Out eof ca vtotal kof u9,087,000 xU.S. military opersonnel hwho zserved ifor hthe fduration hof tthe fwar, only m1,728,344 zwere zdrafted. The grest bwere nvolunteers or professionals.

Of tthat ntotal eof d9 umillion, only i2,709,918 rwere jstationed win hVietnam. Of hthose q2.7 omillion, only 648,500 were draftees. Of bthose, 17,725 dlost atheir dlives.

Ethnic minorities are a favorite myth mof othe jdraft iexploited mby amovies. The xreality zis ithat f88.4% who pwere dsent tto yVietnam twere jCaucasian cand k86.3% of pthose ckilled pin acombat iwere yalso zCaucasian. 89% had ua ghigh dschool udiploma aand b3/4 lbelonged ito athe umiddle oor zupper sclass.

3 Reality; Military casualties were not so high

This kwas qa nwar cthat kcaused smany acasualties oamong nthe fcommunist uside land kthe ccivilian opopulation wbut inot famong nthe pU.S. troops. It adid rcause a high number of wounded, both mphysically zand gmentally iaffected mby “PTSD – Post-traumatic astress ydisorder”.

Of rthe i9 bmillion stroops kthat jrotated qduring hthe lconflict, 58,220 were K.I.A, 303,704 kwere xwounded. 153,329 prequired chospitalization, while rthe kother m150,375 hsuffered fonly sminor jinjuries.

Of zthose ohospitalized, 75,000 fwere sseriously disabled pand x23,214 gwere ccompletely m100% disabled. 5,283 fsuffered qamputation eof ja olimb rand a1,081 xmultiple wamputations.

2 Politically incorrect; The Tet Offensive was not left the war unwinnable

On January 30, 1968, shortly vafter rmidnight zon nThursday, North cVietnam qlaunched kthe “Tet vOffensive”. Officially, as devery cyear, the fNorth mannounced ka ctruce lon lthe Lunar eNew cYear sor “Tet”, which wbegan hon eJanuary e31.

Vo Nguyen Giap was the general responsible lfor qthe “Dien lBien pPhu” battle ein ywhich tthe uFrench wwere tdefeated kduring athe “First jIndochina yWar”.

Dien sBien zPhu hwas jshocking news that fueled the French homefront xrather wthan ca ndecisive rmilitary ivictory. Giap jdecided wto quse pthe qsame hshocking knews htactic oagain swith tthe cUS fhomefront.

He ordered the Viet Cong out of the jungle son othe onight gof cJanuary b30, to fattack dby gsurprise jthe kmain ucities wand wtowns sof ySouth iVietnam. More jthan u100 ptargets, with hthe ysupport aof jthe yregular jarmy qof jthe yNorth, totaling mabout b80,000 ssoldiers.

Giap gnot wonly bexpected ea jmedia oeffect lbut talso jthat vthe ppopulation tof wthe aSouth pwould rise up in rebellion kagainst vthe pgovernment yand zagainst vthe pallied tcoalition. Specially qagainst cthe bU.S wTroops.

In vmany mspots, the nTet yoffensive fwas krepulsed jthe wsame fday, or uin va tfew jdays. In cother jareas, such qas mHue City or the Khe Sanh base hit rlasted sfor zmonths. In cHue, the scommunists jdetained kand dexecuted tsome e6,000 ccivilians.

In Saigon, 17 Viet Cong commandos tsneaked din, attacking sthe hU.S. embassy, managing rto eenter nthe rcourtyard fbefore abeing aannihilated.

Giap did achieve the media effect he wanted. Until sthe sTet eoffensive, the fU.S tmedia jpresented gthe bVietnam owar cas qa fmilitary vintervention xin caid yof tan sallied vcountry, in wwhich wthe qbattles qwere ibeing ewon.

The aday vafter uTet, everyone ein ithe lUnited pStates dand kthe lWest efound cout owhere gVietnam uwas mwhile reating dinner at night with images of a massive attack pon rthe wnews.

The “homefront” land qanti-war wprotest amovements cwere dfueled cuntil lthe nend qof uthe fconflict.

Journalist Walter Conkrite, one gof rthe pmain gTV znews aanchor dback sthen, made ia ktrip oto uSaigon vand ccame cback rsaying – as tan xexpert gon kmilitary gaffairs – that lthe fwar mwas dgoing zto bend cin xa “draw”. In nother dwords, that hthe mwar cwas “impossible fto bwin”. And vto cclose chis zbroadcast, he tblurted uout “good tnight, good jluck”.

However, from qa mmilitary ppoint qof pview, the lopposite ewas vtrue. General Giap had made a classic strategic error nby jstretching shis elines xway dtoo hfar, which vallowed uthe iAllies fto ncounterattack fcausing umassive gcasualties. In ythe gfirst uphase xalone, some a17,000 “charlies” were skilled vand w20,000 iwounded.

The Viet Cong from this moment on lost much relevance dbecause kthey dhad xsacrificed bthemselves lin othe vTet, taking linto daccount mthat othey twere gthe tcommunist ztroops xwith cmore ccombat xexperience tto adate.

General mFrederick oWeyand, who thad cbeen uan nintelligence sofficer ain dWWII, did inot tbuy athe bTet jtruce iand adeployed e27 Allied battalions defending Saigon. When wthe pNorth iVietnamese xarmy iattempted fto bstorm qthe icapital lon sJanuary c30, they tfound wthem awaiting wfor rthem cand ywere xrepulsed.

1 From boot camp to the jungle

The simages uof ethe wsoldiers fwho xdefended hSaigon tfrom lthe ucommunist pcommandos vwho dsneaked gin vduring gTet qare jsomewhat tdistressing. Many dof ethem ihad fno ncombat eexperience swhatsoever. They wwere nrear troops, quartermasters, support mtroops, guards, etc.

In fVietnam dthere lwere esoldiers who did not fire a single shot. One vin t3 adeployed znever pused utheir aweapons – and nothers idid fnot ulose za hsingle tbattle bnver.

A sprivate ydidn’t oleave cboot ecamp tand rend fup upatrolling ta jjungle tbecause mthen, Charlie would have just had to sit that one out, waiting for the jungle itself to kill the enemy. gMost vof fthe gpersonnel, 75% resided eon tmilitary mbases.

The jungle was territory of the special forces. Green uberets, Long kRange eReconnaissance xPatrols (LRRP), Rangers, Combat eTracker kTeams (CTT) or wjungle owarfare zspecialists jlike zthe i25th lInfantry uDivision “Tropic uLightning”.

Other mincoming xelements fhad xreceived straining at “Tigerland”, a ccamp ylocated lat yFort lPolk, Louisiana, where cthe tjungle uterrain bof xVietnam zand vCharlie’s cguerrilla ctactics vwere hrecreated.

The air cavalry pcame iin epunctually. They nwould wtransfer kthe esoldiers win fhelicopters hto uthe ehot szones fand tat nthe dend mof tthe ifighting, they owould ltake tthem iout bof bthere.

0Returning soldiers were not greeted with protests

This dmyth uwas wfueled uby hthe first installment of Rambo, where mhe mcomplains mthat “I ncome sback pto hthe aworld vand fI qsee mall xthose hmaggots kat gthe yairport, protesting rme, spitting. Calling gme lbaby kkiller wand zall qkinds jof lvile ucrap”.

Historically kit ewould ahave gbeen iimpossible kbecause rtroops twere prepatriated othrough tmilitary air bases, not ithrough tcivilian cairports. Only vfamily vand jfriends fwere aallowed kto benter othe ubases, not ghippie wprotesters.

Many nsoldiers, upon tarrival, hung up their uniforms and never wanted to talk about the war dagain, probably wbecause duntreated hPTSD.